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A Behavioral Theory of Elections$
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Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780691135076

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691135076.001.0001

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Elections with Multiple Parties

Elections with Multiple Parties

Chapter:
(p.161) Chapter Seven Elections with Multiple Parties
Source:
A Behavioral Theory of Elections
Author(s):

Jonathan Bendor

Daniel Diermeier

David A. Siegel

Michael M. Ting

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691135076.003.0007

This chapter extends the model used for two-party elections to multiparty democracies. It first considers the module models for party competition and voter turnout to see what modifications are required in order to extend the framework to multiple candidates and to identify what analytical results carry over to this context. It then discusses game-theoretic models of the bandwagon effect before presenting a computational model for one of the most well-known problems in the study of multiparty elections: voter coordination in plurality-rule elections and Duverger’s Law. The model leads to the selection of Condorcet winners yet allows significant vote shares for all candidates. It also does a good job of accounting for the partial coordination seen in election data from the United Kingdom. In addition, the simulation results show that the majority factions successfully coordinate as long as the incentives for coordination are sufficiently high.

Keywords:   party competition, voter turnout, game-theoretic model, bandwagon effect, computational model, multiparty elections, voter coordination, Duverger’s Law, Condorcet winner, majority faction

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