This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of how cultural differences are deeply relevant contemporary debates about moral responsibility. This is because (1) contemporary philosophical theories of moral responsibility develop universal conditions for fair assignments of blame and praise; and (2) they appeal to intuitions about cases and principles to justify these conditions. Consequently, these theories rely on empirical assumptions about the universality of the intuitions to which they appeal. This book develops an empirical and philosophical challenge to this assumption, one that if successful casts doubt on the prospect of establishing any theory of responsibility as objectively correct. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
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