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Philosophy of Law$
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Andrei Marmor

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780691141671

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691141671.001.0001

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Authority, Conventions, and the Normativity of Law

Authority, Conventions, and the Normativity of Law

(p.60) Chapter Three Authority, Conventions, and the Normativity of Law
Philosophy of Law

Andrei Marmor

Princeton University Press

This chapter completes the outlines of a plausible version of legal positivism. It is organized into two parts. The first section discusses some of Joseph Raz's ideas about the nature of practical authority and the implications of his views about the normativity of law. The second section returns to the rules of recognition and tries to show that, though H. L. A. Hart is basically right about the idea that social rules are at the foundations of law, we need a theory of social conventions to articulate the requisite foundations. These two ideas in hand—the authoritative nature of law and its conventional foundations—provide the main building blocks needed to reconstruct a plausible version of Hart's theory of law.

Keywords:   H. L. A. Hart, legal philosophy, nature of law, legal positivism, theory of law, Joseph Raz

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