Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophy of Law$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Andrei Marmor

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780691141671

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691141671.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in HSO for personal use (for details see www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 16 November 2018

Is Law Determined by Morality?

Is Law Determined by Morality?

(p.84) Chapter Four Is Law Determined by Morality?
Philosophy of Law

Andrei Marmor

Princeton University Press

This chapter considers the contemporary versions of the substantive nondetachment view about the nature of law. This view takes two main forms. According to Dworkin's influential theory, law's content can never be detached from normative considerations. What the law is—always, and necessarily—depends on certain evaluative considerations about what it ought to be. A more moderate version of this nondetachment view holds that whether the content of law can or cannot be detached from normative considerations is a contingent matter, depending on the norms that happen to prevail in a given legal system, and thus the nondetachment view is at least sometimes true. The main argument of this chapter is that both of these views are mistaken.

Keywords:   nondetachment view, nature of law, legal philosophy, Dworkin, normative consideration

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.