Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Worse Than a MonolithAlliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas J. Christensen

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780691142609

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691142609.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in HSO for personal use (for details see http://www.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 15 December 2017

The Benefits of Communist Alliance Coordination and the Continuing Costs of U.S. Alliance Formation, 1951–56

The Benefits of Communist Alliance Coordination and the Continuing Costs of U.S. Alliance Formation, 1951–56

Chapter:
(p.109) Chapter 4 The Benefits of Communist Alliance Coordination and the Continuing Costs of U.S. Alliance Formation, 1951–56
Source:
Worse Than a Monolith
Author(s):

Thomas J. Christensen

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691142609.003.0004

This chapter examines the mixed blessing of enhanced communist coordination during the mid-1950s. During this period, a relatively well-coordinated and organized communist alliance allowed for more moderation and clearer signaling during the negotiations that ended fighting in the Korean War and the conflict in Indochina. The chapter considers the United States' formation of regional alliances and how the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted in 1954. It shows how a relatively unified allied position on Southeast Asia in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) served as a restraint on the most aggressive members of the alliance, the local communists involved in civil wars: Kim Il-sung and Ho Chi Minh. Aside from Beijing's nationalistic reaction in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese foreign policy would be relatively moderate in the middle 1950s and fully in tune with Soviet designs for a breathing spell in the Cold War.

Keywords:   communist coordination, Korean War, Indochina, United States, alliances, Taiwan Strait crisis, Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, foreign policy, Cold War

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.