This chapter considers the extent to which contextualism constitutes a further rival view in epistemology proper, and offers reasons to doubt that it is. Contextualism has gained center stage in epistemology mainly through its way with the skeptic, from the early days of “relevant alternatives” to more recent incarnations. Contextualism in epistemology concerns mainly threshold-setting mechanisms. The words involved, mainly the verb “to know” and its cognates, mark whether the subject lies above a threshold along one or more dimensions. While this chapter proceeds with an acceptance of the elements of contextualism, the chapter also enters some doubts about its implications for epistemology proper.
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