This chapter examines realist views about truth. Traditional realists would insist, against traditional idealists and pragmatists, that whether the proposition that snow is white is true depends on whether snow really is white, and not on whether the thought that it is fits comfortably with our other ideas or is convenient to adopt in practice. Deflationists cannot be accused of holding that the truth of the proposition depends on our comfort or convenience, but some realists complain that deflationism cannot account for a clear commonsense intuition according to which it is snow's being white that makes the proposition true—and not vice versa. The chapter first compares realism with deflationism before discussing correspondence theories, truthmaker theories, physicalism, utility, and normativity.
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