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Mere PossibilitiesMetaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics$
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Robert Stalnaker

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691147123

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691147123.001.0001

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Merely Possible Possible Worlds

Merely Possible Possible Worlds

Chapter:
(p.22) 2 Merely Possible Possible Worlds
Source:
Mere Possibilities
Author(s):

Robert Stalnaker

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691147123.003.0002

This chapter first sketches a minimal theory of propositions—one that ascribes to propositions just the structure that anyone who is willing to talk of propositions at all must ascribe to them. It extends the minimal theory by adding some assumptions about the modal properties of propositions and possibilities, and then sketches a general model of logical space that makes room for merely possible possibilities. Next, it considers the relation between models and the reality that they purport to model and the extent to which our theory of propositions and possibilities provides a realistic semantics. Finally, it responds to some arguments against the thesis that propositions may exist contingently.

Keywords:   propositions, minimal theory, modal properties, possibilities

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