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How We HopeA Moral Psychology$
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Adrienne M. Martin

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780691151526

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691151526.001.0001

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Normative Hope

Normative Hope

Chapter:
(p.118) 5 Normative Hope
Source:
How We Hope
Author(s):

Adrienne M. Martin

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691151526.003.0006

This chapter argues that hope plays a crucial role in our standard ways of relating to each other “interpersonally” (and to ourselves intrapersonally). One way that we relate to each other interpersonally—or from the “participant stance”—is to hold each other responsible. This mode of interaction is best construed as a “normative expectation.” This chapter argues that to normatively expect someone to comply with a requirement is to be prepared to justify a narrow set of “reactive” feelings: resentment, indignation, and guilt. Normative expectation and these reactive feelings are at the heart of relating to people as rational agents by holding them responsible.

Keywords:   participant stance, normative expectation, normative hope, reactive feelings, interpersonal relations, interaction, resentment, indignation, guilt

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