This chapter argues that hope plays a crucial role in our standard ways of relating to each other “interpersonally” (and to ourselves intrapersonally). One way that we relate to each other interpersonally—or from the “participant stance”—is to hold each other responsible. This mode of interaction is best construed as a “normative expectation.” This chapter argues that to normatively expect someone to comply with a requirement is to be prepared to justify a narrow set of “reactive” feelings: resentment, indignation, and guilt. Normative expectation and these reactive feelings are at the heart of relating to people as rational agents by holding them responsible.
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