This chapter attempts to integrate two different strands of research on political violence, developing a theoretical model to analyze the common roots of repression and civil war. Under specific assumptions about the conflict technology, it shows that peace, repression (one-sided violence), and civil war (two-sided violence) become ordered states depending on a common underlying latent variable, which is shifted by shocks to the value of public goods, wages, aid, and resource rents. But these effects only emerge when political institutions do not provide sufficient checks and balances on the ruling group or adequate protection for those excluded from power. The chapter also shows how to start bridging the gap between theoretical modeling and econometric testing. Under specific assumptions on what can be observed, the predictions from the model can be taken to the data by estimating either an ordered logit or the conditional probability of transition from peace to violence or from non-civil war to civil war. The empirical strategy here is much sharper than in earlier chapters and shows that the kind of theory we are building can help us approach the data in a specific way.
Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.