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Monitoring DemocracyWhen International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails$
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Judith G. Kelley

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691152776

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691152776.001.0001

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International Monitors as Reinforcement

International Monitors as Reinforcement

Chapter:
(p.97) Chapter 6 International Monitors as Reinforcement
Source:
Monitoring Democracy
Author(s):

Judith G. Kelley

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691152776.003.0006

This chapter studies how international monitors may improve elections and when their efforts may be more likely to succeed or fail. It argues that monitors can indeed improve elections, but their influence is conditioned by domestic and international factors. In reality, monitors play a reinforcement role by building on existing domestic potential and enhancing the effectiveness of other international leverage. International election monitors can improve the quality of elections through two main mechanisms. First, monitors can alter incentives by increasing the risk of exposure, signaling increasing international cost, increasing domestic cost, or increasing the incentives for honesty. Second, monitors can alter the domestic conditions by recommending legal and institutional changes, and by teaching new norms and building capacity and skills that reinforce good electoral practices.

Keywords:   international monitors, elections, reinforcement, domestic potential, international leverage, honesty, good electoral practices

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