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Reforming the European UnionRealizing the Impossible$
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Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and George Tsebelis

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691153926

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691153926.001.0001

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Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention

Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention

Chapter:
(p.62) Chapter Two Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention
Source:
Reforming the European Union
Author(s):

Sven-Oliver Proksch

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691153926.003.0003

This chapter examines agenda control in the European Convention from a positional, rather than an institutional, angle. Convention President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's ability to extract so many concessions from the Convention depended to a large part on his central position within the conflict space. The chapter tests this argument by estimating revealed constitutional preferences in the European Convention of both the delegates and the Presidency. Thus, it argues that the Convention's success was partially due to positional agenda control by its presidency. This in turn allowed it to successfully employ strategic agenda control to eliminate amendments, select proposals, and finally propose a coherent draft for a European constitution. The chapter's basic premise is that the work of the European Convention marks a milestone for European institutional reform.

Keywords:   European Convention, European Union, agenda control, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, institutional reform, EU

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