This chapter argues that deliberative democracy is morally desirable but not strictly a moral requirement by focusing on superdeliberators and superdeliberation. The superdeliberator is a close relative of the philosopher-citizen. Each corresponds to the two meanings of “deliberation” in democratic theory, as reasoned thought and reasoned talk. The chapter first describes four necessary conditions that make a democratic theory deliberative before presenting two claims for the supererogation of deliberation at the micro- and macrodemocratic level. It then considers the belief by deliberativists that citizens have a standing obligation to participate periodically in contestatory forums. It also rejects the notion that the quantity and diffusion of public speech acts envisaged by deliberative theory is a necessary property of a morally acceptable social order. Finally, it examines the bare moral obligations that attach to citizens' reasoning about politics.
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