This chapter looks at cases where S has a true belief P but we are nonetheless inclined to say she does not know P. This is illustrated in a headache which S is hypothetically suffering. In everyday contexts it sounds odd to say of someone that she believes she has a headache, and equally odd to say she knows. This has encouraged some philosophers to conclude that it is inappropriate to talk of either belief or knowledge in such cases. An alternative diagnosis, however, is that the “owner” of a headache is in such a superior position compared with others with respect to determining whether she herself has a headache that it is usually enough to say of her that she has a headache and unnecessary, and hence odd sounding, to add that she believes or knows this.
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