Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral Perception$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Robert Audi

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780691156484

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in HSO for personal use (for details see www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 October 2018

Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements

Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements

(p.30) Chapter 2 Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements
Moral Perception

Robert Audi

Princeton University Press

This chapter analyzes how perception is a kind of experiential information-bearing relation between the perceiver and the object perceived. It argues that even if moral properties are not themselves causal, they can be perceptible. But the dependence of moral perception on non-moral perception does not imply an inferential dependence of all moral belief or moral judgment on non-moral belief or judgment. This kind of grounding explains how a moral belief arising in perception can constitute perceptual knowledge and can do so on grounds that are publicly accessible and, though not a guarantee of it, a basis for ethical agreement. The chapter also shows how perceptual moral knowledge is connected not only with other moral knowledge but also with intuition and emotion.

Keywords:   perception, moral properties, non-moral perception, moral judgment, moral belief, ethical agreement, intuition, emotion

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.