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Moral Perception$
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Robert Audi

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780691156484

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691156484.001.0001

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The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics

The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics

(p.143) Chapter 7 The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics
Moral Perception

Robert Audi

Princeton University Press

This chapter discusses emotion and intuition, and offers an illustration of how they arise in several moral domains as well as a sketch of the place of moral imagination in bringing both to bear on the formation of moral judgments. It should be no surprise that emotion can support intuition and its propositional content. Emotion is often a discriminative response to perceptible aspects of people or of things in the environment. In some cases it can magnify, unify, or extend the work of perception and thereby provide evidence concerning the person or situation perceived. The evidence may derive its force largely from the perceptible elements that underlie emotion, but emotion may also provide a kind of evidence of its own.

Keywords:   emotion, intuition, moral imagination, moral judgments, perceptible elements, moral domains

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