This chapter emphasizes that the internal sources of information discussed in the previous chapter are complementary to each other and to market-based techniques. In deciding whether to assign liability in a particular case, all such evidence on detection should be considered in light of the decision-theoretic approach articulated previously. Some forms of proof are more reliable than others and give rise to different risks of particular types of errors. For example, some market-based techniques that attempt to determine firms' marginal costs could result in adverse incentive effects in the case of underestimation, making it optimal to find liability only if the measured price elevation is substantial or other confirming evidence is present. The chapter also considers two additional matters: liability for attempts and the problem of determining which firms should be held liable.
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