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The Bounds of ReasonGame Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences$
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Herbert Gintis

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780691160849

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.001.0001

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The Logical Antinomies of Knowledge

The Logical Antinomies of Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.123) 6 The Logical Antinomies of Knowledge
Source:
The Bounds of Reason
Author(s):

Herbert Gintis

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0006

The critique of common knowledge of rationality (CKR) developed in the preceding chapters should convince researchers interested in explaining social reality to simply avoid the concept. The actual cost of abandoning CKR in terms of explaining social behavior is minimal because the Nash equilibrium concept itself is problematic when the recursive nature of interagent beliefs is important and the correlated equilibrium is by far the more cogent equilibrium concept. Nevertheless, it may seem curious that we must reject CKR even in situations where all players are in fact rational. What, after all, is the problem with assuming agents know something that is in fact true? This chapter discusses the pitfalls of naïve epistemic logic, the common knowledge of logicality paradox, the Surprise Examination problem, the modal logic of knowledge, and a solution to the Surprise Examination conundrum.

Keywords:   common knowledge of rationality, CKR, game theory, epistemic logic, Surprise Examination problem, social reality, social behavior

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