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The Bounds of ReasonGame Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences$
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Herbert Gintis

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780691160849

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.001.0001

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Chapter:
(p.221) 12 Summary
Source:
The Bounds of Reason
Author(s):

Herbert Gintis

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0012

This chapter summarizes the book's main points, covering game theory, the commonality of beliefs, the limits of rationality, social norms as correlated equilibria, and how reason is bounded by sociality, not irrationality. Among the conclusions are that game theory is an indispensable tool in modeling human behavior. Behavioral disciplines that reject or peripheralize game theory are theoretically handicapped. The Nash equilibrium is not the appropriate equilibrium concept for social theory. The correlated equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept for a set of rational individuals having common priors. Social norms are correlated equilibria. The behavioral disciplines today have four incompatible models of human behavior. The behavioral sciences must develop a unified model of choice that eliminates these incompatibilities and that can be specialized in different ways to meet the heterogeneous needs of the various disciplines.

Keywords:   game theory, commonality of beliefs, rationality, social norms, correlated equilibria, sociality, reason, Nash equilibrium, behavioral sciences

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