This chapter examines John Locke's definition of “Person” by showing that “the Person or self that I am, the individual morally accountable subject of experience [P] that I am, considered at any given particular time t, consists of the following things: [M] my living body at t, [I] my soul at t, and [A] all the actions and experiences, past and present, of the individual persisting subject of experience that I am of which I am now (occurrently or dispositionally) conscious at t.” The chapter also analyzes Locke's statement that consciousness of one of Nestor's actions would make one “the same person with Nestor” and argues that he is not concerned with the essential link between consciousness and concernment, but with the sensory-cognitive core of consciousness and the no less purely cognitive capacity for temporally extended full self-consciousness.
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