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Epistemic AngstRadical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing$
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Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780691167237

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction
Source:
Epistemic Angst
Author(s):

Duncan Pritchard

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.003.0001

This introductory chapter argues that integrating epistemological disjunctivism with Wittgenstein's radical account of the structure of rational evaluation can solve the problem of radical skepticism. On the face of it, these proposals look very different; indeed, they look antithetical and competing. Whereas the one proposal emphasizes the locality of rational evaluation, and hence rational support, the other emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial, the chapter asserts. In fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit.

Keywords:   epistemic angst, epistemological disjunctivism, radical skepticism, rational evaluation, Ludwig Wittgenstein, rational support, philosophy

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