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Global ProductionFirms, Contracts, and Trade Structure$
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Pol Antràs

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780691168272

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691168272.001.0001

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Contracts and Export Behavior

Contracts and Export Behavior

Chapter:
(p.59) 3 Contracts and Export Behavior
Source:
Global Production
Author(s):

Pol Antràs

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691168272.003.0003

This chapter develops simple imperfect-contracting variants of the Melitz model of exporting and discusses empirical evidence suggestive of the role of these frictions as determinants of the structure of international trade flows. It explores both theoretically as well as empirically the significance of weak contract enforcement for the export decisions of firms and, more broadly, for the structure of international trade flows. As explained in Chapter 1, the rapid growth in intermediate input trade has been one of the most prominent developments in the world economy in recent years. At the same time, the contractual relationships that support the phenomenon of offshoring are much more intricate than those that support the mere shipment of goods across countries. Thus, weak contract enforcement has the potential to affect the global organization of production in more profound ways than has been studied so far.

Keywords:   Melitz model, imperfect-contracting variants, contractual frictions, international trade flows, weak contract enforcement, contractual relationships, export behavior

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