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Pritchard, D. (2015-12-22). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons. In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. : Princeton University Press. Retrieved 28 Jun. 2022, from https://princeton.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.001.0001/upso-9780691167237-chapter-006.

Pritchard, Duncan. "Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons." Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. : Princeton University Press,  19. Princeton Scholarship Online. Date Accessed 28 Jun. 2022 <https://princeton.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.001.0001/upso-9780691167237-chapter-006>.

Pritchard, Duncan. "Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons." In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press, 2015. Princeton Scholarship Online, 2017. doi: 10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.003.0006.

Pritchard D. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons. In: Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press; 2015. https://princeton.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.001.0001/upso-9780691167237-chapter-006. Accessed June 28, 2022.