Players have different skills, which has implications for the degree to which they make errors. Low-skill hitters in baseball often swing at bad pitches, beginning skiers frequently fall for no apparent reason, and children often lose at tic-tac-toe. At the other extreme, there are brilliant chess players, bargainers, and litigators who seem to know exactly what move to make or offer to decline. From a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) perspective, these skill levels can be modeled in terms of variation in error rates or in responsiveness of quantal response functions. This chapter explores issues related to individual heterogeneity with respect to player error rates. It also describes some extensions of QRE that relax the assumption that player expectations about the choice behavior of other players are correct. For example, in games that are played only once, players are not able to learn from others' prior decisions, and expectations must be based on introspection. The chapter develops the implications of noisy introspection embedded in a model of iterated thinking.
Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.