This chapter talks about Ronald de Sousa's dramatic claim that emotions are species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies. It provides an adequate background on emotion and arguments on the integral view of the role of emotion in virtue. It also analyzes the psychology of emotion, a judicious smattering of philosophy that harness Christine Tappolet's overview. The chapter investigates the biological hypothesis on the function of emotion in solving the philosopher's frame problem, meaning the problem of how to make use of just what is needed from the stupendous quantity of knowledge and how not to retrieve what is not needed. It narrates a story from Daniel Dennett about a robot that is informed a bomb is set to go off in its vicinity that resents a moral that pure reason is not sufficient to solve de Sousa's problem.
Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.