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Emotion and Virtue$
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Gopal Sreenivasan

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780691134550

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: May 2021

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.001.0001

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Adverbial Requirements

Adverbial Requirements

6 (p.110) Adverbial Requirements (p.111)
Emotion and Virtue

Gopal Sreenivasan

Princeton University Press

This chapter explores the nature of the virtue of compassion, in which every exemplar of compassion's generic ability is to make correct moral judgements in situations that call for compassion that is partly constituted by a morally rectified sympathy trait. It discusses the role assigned to emotion by the structure of the integral view that can be filled by an emotion that is conveniently both independently familiar and independently marked. It also distinguishes between sympathy and empathy, as well as between emotion traits and virtue traits. The chapter examines the two distinctions that yield a clean contrast between the emotion of 'sympathy' and the virtue of 'compassion.'

Keywords:   compassion, generic ability, sympathy trait, integral view, emotion traits, virtue traits

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