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Emotion and Virtue$
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Gopal Sreenivasan

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780691134550

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: May 2021

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.001.0001

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Salience without a Black Box

Salience without a Black Box

(p.129) 7 Salience without a Black Box
Emotion and Virtue

Gopal Sreenivasan

Princeton University Press

This chapter defends the integral view of compassion against black box views. It argues that the combination of cleverness, a morally rectified sympathy trait, and supplementary moral knowledge suffices in principle to explain an agent's ability to pass the central test of virtue (CTV) for compassion. It also isolates the disagreement between the integral view and black box views against the background of a pair of parallel stipulations, whereby it was assumed that each view provides a set of conditions sufficient to explain an agent's ability to pass CTV for compassion. The chapter looks at the integral view of compassion, which can be seen to explain an agent's ability to pass CTV. It claims that the nature of the virtue of compassion is that every exemplar of compassion's generic ability to pass CTV is partly constituted by a morally rectified sympathy trait.

Keywords:   black box, virtue, compassion, parallel stipulations, integral view, sympathy trait, cleverness

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