Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Emotion and Virtue$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Gopal Sreenivasan

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780691134550

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: May 2021

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 20 May 2022

Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect

Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect

Chapter:
(p.168) 8 Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect
Source:
Emotion and Virtue
Author(s):

Gopal Sreenivasan

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0008

This chapter argues that deferring to the feelings of an exemplar of virtue is sometimes the best way to figure out what the morally right thing to do is in a given practical situation. It stresses that ordinary people are sometimes warranted in deferring to an exemplar of virtue about what should be done in some practical situation. It also points out that the authority of an exemplar of virtue's advice is partly constituted by the proto-authority of the emotional response to the agent's situation. The chapter explores the proposition that moral deference is sometimes warranted, clarifying that the prescription or advice to which deference is warranted concerns the requirements of some virtue. It emphasizes that critics of moral deference distinguish accepting moral advice from moral deference proper.

Keywords:   ordinary people, virtue, proto-authority, moral deference, moral advice

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.