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Emotion and Virtue$
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Gopal Sreenivasan

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780691134550

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: May 2021

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.001.0001

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Agents versus Acts

Agents versus Acts

Chapter:
10 (p.242) Agents versus Acts (p.243)
Source:
Emotion and Virtue
Author(s):

Gopal Sreenivasan

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0010

This chapter mentions philosophers who take it as criterial of virtue to be theoretically distinctive that the definition of virtue somehow assign priority to the agent. It discusses a coherent intermediate position called the modest agent-centred view, which holds that some non paradigmatic acts of kindness can only be identified as kind acts by exploiting the fact that they are the characteristic act expressions of a kindness. It also highlights how the modest agent-centred view survives certain objections that are damaging to the extreme agent-centred view. The chapter describes the modest agent-centred view and the extreme act view as true contenders in the epistemological priority debate. It confirms whether the act is required by compassion in the sense that the value to which compassion corresponds gives the agent good reason to perform the act.

Keywords:   virtue, kindness, intermediate position, agent-centred view, extreme act view, compassion

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