Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation
Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation
This chapter tests the theoretical propositions about domestic politics developed in chapter 2. Using a new dataset, it aims to identify the domestic and international factors that affect a country's decision to join and ratify a preferential trading arrangement (PTA). It reviews whys democratic regimes are especially likely to enter PTAs and why a large number of veto players reduce the odds that a country will join such arrangements. Then, it tests these arguments after accounting for the effects of various other economic and international variables, including those that were of greatest importance in the systemic analysis conducted in chapter 3. The results provide strong support for these claims. Both regime type and veto players significantly influence whether and when states conclude trade agreements.
Keywords: domestic politics, preferential trading arrangements, international trade agreements, trade relations, regime type
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