Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements
Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements
This chapter examines three auxiliary hypotheses that flow from the main argument. First, in countries with more veto players it is less likely that political leaders will be able to form deeper integration agreements. As trade agreements become more constraining, they will prompt greater resistance from more groups. Hence, countries marked by a large number of veto players are unlikely to accede to agreements that aim to achieve more extensive integration. Second, in the same vein, political leaders are also unlikely to enter preferential trading arrangements that include more constraints, such as a dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, in countries with more veto players, we expect greater delays between signing and ratifying agreements. As the number of veto players rises, so does the time needed for the government to convince these groups of the agreement's value and to design ways of compensating those that will be harmed by it.
Keywords: preferential trading arrangements, international trade agreements, veto players, ratification
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