Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Party CompetitionAn Agent-Based Model$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780691139036

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691139036.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 25 June 2022

Endogenous Parties, Interaction of Different Decision Rules

Endogenous Parties, Interaction of Different Decision Rules

(p.106) Chapter Six Endogenous Parties, Interaction of Different Decision Rules
Party Competition

Michael Laver

Ernest Sergenti

Princeton University Press

This chapter attempts to develop more realistic and interesting models in which the set of competing parties is a completely endogenous output of the process of party competition. It also seeks to model party competition when different party leaders use different decision rules in the same setting by building on an approach pioneered in a different context by Robert Axelrod. This involves long-running computer “tournaments” that allow investigation of the performance and “robustness” of decision rules in an environment where any politician using any rule may encounter an opponent using either the same decision rule or some quite different rule. The chapter is most interested in how a decision rule performs against anything the competitive environment might throw against it, including agents using decision rules that are difficult to anticipate and/or comprehend.

Keywords:   multiparty competition, political parties, party competition, Robert Axelrod, decisions rules

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.