Propositional Experience
Propositional Experience
This chapter presents an account of experiential states to which the AAA (accurate, adroit, apt) structure is applicable. It refers to four different ways in which our experience (apprehension) of sensa (sense data) might be direct. The directness could be causal, justificatory, inferential, or referential; the chapter dwells on each one with more detail. The crucial problem for the theory of sensa is how to defend its move beyond the first to the second stage. The chapter introduces a fourfold distinction among forms of awareness to approach the question of whether sensory experience can ever fail to be self-intimating, whether we can ever fail to be aware of some sensory experience that we are then anyhow undergoing.
Keywords: experiential states, propositional experience, sensa, sense data, experience, awareness, sensory experience, apprehension
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