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Stephen Yablo

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780691144955

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691144955.001.0001

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Confirmation and Verisimilitude

Confirmation and Verisimilitude

(p.95) 6 Confirmation and Verisimilitude

Stephen Yablo

Princeton University Press

This chapter argues that logical subtraction has a role to play in confirmation theory via the notion of surplus content. Subject matter does, too, via the notion of content-part. Content-part lets us define a new type of evidential relation; E pervasively probabilifies H if it probabilifies “all of it,” meaning H and its parts. This helps with the tacking and raven paradoxes. Equivalent generalizations can be about different things, which affect their evidential relations. Inductive skeptics do not care about confirmation, but they derive some benefit too, for they care about verisimilitude—one theory having more truth in it than another—and the truth in a theory is made up of its wholly true parts.

Keywords:   truth, versimilitude, confirmation theory, surplus content, subject matter, content-part, aboutness, logical subtraction, verisimilitude

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