The Missing Premise
The Missing Premise
This chapter proposes a situation wherein we are trying to win acceptance of A from an interlocutor who admits only B. A is not implied by B, so there are B-worlds where A is false. Who is to say that our world is not among them? This is where R comes in. A ought to inherit whatever plausibility attaches to R, for A is implied by R and B, and B is common ground. More carefully, A inherits whatever independent plausibility attaches to R. R makes a case for A only insofar as it is plausible in its own right. Our preferences can to some extent be explained on this basis.
Keywords: preferences, semantics, aboutness
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