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How We HopeA Moral Psychology$
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Adrienne M. Martin

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780691151526

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691151526.001.0001

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(p.35) 2 Incorporation
How We Hope

Adrienne M. Martin

Princeton University Press

This chapter further elaborates the incorporation analysis. Hope does indeed involve the basic elements of the orthodox definition—the desire for an outcome and a subjective probability estimate between 0 and 1. In addition, hope, when most fully realized, makes use of our capacities of self-reflection and rational justification; when we hope, we treat both our desire and our probability assignment as justifying reasons for hopeful activities. This is the feature that unifies the syndromatic elements of thought, feeling, and planning, and makes hope a distinctive and cohesive practical attitude. The chapter argues further that the justifications to which we commit ourselves in virtue of hoping are practical justifications, and that there are few epistemic or theoretical limitations on rational hope. It concludes by addressing the disadvantages of this analysis.

Keywords:   incorporation analysis, orthodox definition, subjective probability estimate, self-reflection, rational justification, hopeful activities, practical justifications, rational hope

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