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Reforming the European UnionRealizing the Impossible$
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Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and George Tsebelis

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691153926

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691153926.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 19 February 2020

From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis

From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis

(p.28) Chapter One From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis
Reforming the European Union

George Tsebelis

Princeton University Press

This chapter compares the policy and political outcomes that followed from the institutional structures generated by the European Convention, the Treaty of Lisbon, and the default outcome of a failure of negotiations during the process of European integration, the Treaty of Nice. The institutions produced under these different arrangements empowered different actors to create the policies of the EU. The comparison is based on the theory of veto players and is aimed at demonstrating the potential differences in policy outcomes for the EU had future policies been made in each of these institutional settings. In particular, it focuses on the effects of different institutional arrangements on the democratic deficit and the extent to which they strengthen the capacity of the judiciary powers and the bureaucracy to create policies independently from electorally accountable actors.

Keywords:   European Convention, Treaty of Lisbon, European integration, Treaty of Nice, European Union, EU, veto players, institutional arrangements, democratic deficit, judiciary powers

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