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When Is True Belief Knowledge?$
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Richard Foley

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691154725

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.001.0001

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(p.86) Chapter 16 Disjunctions
When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Richard Foley

Princeton University Press

This chapter considers whether disjunctions create any special problems for the view that knowledge is to be understood in terms of adequate information. It illustrates a disjunction through the scenario of a flipped coin: suppose a fair coin has been flipped and lies covered on the back of S's hand. Let P be that the flipped coin has landed heads and Q that it has landed tails. S does not believe P and does not believe Q, but she does believe (P or Q). Suppose it is P that is true, that is, the coin has landed heads. Although P is a truth that S lacks, this does not prevent her from knowing the disjunction (P or Q), and the chapter explains why.

Keywords:   disjunctions, truths, conjunctions, philosophical problems, knowledge

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