- Title Pages
-
Chapter 1 An Observation -
Chapter 2 Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge -
Chapter 3 Knowledge Stories -
Chapter 4 Intuitions about Knowledge -
Chapter 5 Important Truths -
Chapter 6 Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs -
Chapter 7 The Beetle in the Box -
Chapter 8 Knowledge Blocks -
Chapter 9 The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief -
Chapter 10 The Value of True Belief -
Chapter 11 The Value of Knowledge -
Chapter 12 The Lottery and Preface -
Chapter 13 Reverse Lottery Stories -
Chapter 14 Lucky Knowledge -
Chapter 15 Closure and Skepticism -
Chapter 16 Disjunctions -
Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge -
Chapter 18 Instability and Knowledge -
Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters -
Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know -
Chapter 21 Introspective Knowledge -
Chapter 22 Perceptual Knowledge -
Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge -
Chapter 24 Collective Knowledge -
Chapter 25 A Look Back -
Chapter 26 Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality -
Chapter 27 The Core Concepts of Epistemology - Index
Fixedness and Knowledge
Fixedness and Knowledge
- Chapter:
- (p.88) Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge
- Source:
- When Is True Belief Knowledge?
- Author(s):
Richard Foley
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
This chapter illustrates fixedness of belief and how it can or cannot be considered knowledge. Ordinarily, when one has a true belief and also enough information to know, one's belief is neither impervious to change nor isolated from one's other beliefs about the situation. Fixedness as the chapter demonstrates can become something more akin to an obsession or a compulsion. Such a thing is not subject to the processes of regulation, revision, and influence that governs one's other opinions and thus looks more like a rigidified state external to one's belief system than something inside it, subject to the give and take of neighboring opinions.
Keywords: fixedness, true beliefs, belief system, neighboring opinions, ordinary belief
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- Title Pages
-
Chapter 1 An Observation -
Chapter 2 Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge -
Chapter 3 Knowledge Stories -
Chapter 4 Intuitions about Knowledge -
Chapter 5 Important Truths -
Chapter 6 Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs -
Chapter 7 The Beetle in the Box -
Chapter 8 Knowledge Blocks -
Chapter 9 The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief -
Chapter 10 The Value of True Belief -
Chapter 11 The Value of Knowledge -
Chapter 12 The Lottery and Preface -
Chapter 13 Reverse Lottery Stories -
Chapter 14 Lucky Knowledge -
Chapter 15 Closure and Skepticism -
Chapter 16 Disjunctions -
Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge -
Chapter 18 Instability and Knowledge -
Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters -
Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know -
Chapter 21 Introspective Knowledge -
Chapter 22 Perceptual Knowledge -
Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge -
Chapter 24 Collective Knowledge -
Chapter 25 A Look Back -
Chapter 26 Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality -
Chapter 27 The Core Concepts of Epistemology - Index
