- Title Pages
-
Chapter 1 An Observation -
Chapter 2 Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge -
Chapter 3 Knowledge Stories -
Chapter 4 Intuitions about Knowledge -
Chapter 5 Important Truths -
Chapter 6 Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs -
Chapter 7 The Beetle in the Box -
Chapter 8 Knowledge Blocks -
Chapter 9 The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief -
Chapter 10 The Value of True Belief -
Chapter 11 The Value of Knowledge -
Chapter 12 The Lottery and Preface -
Chapter 13 Reverse Lottery Stories -
Chapter 14 Lucky Knowledge -
Chapter 15 Closure and Skepticism -
Chapter 16 Disjunctions -
Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge -
Chapter 18 Instability and Knowledge -
Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters -
Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know -
Chapter 21 Introspective Knowledge -
Chapter 22 Perceptual Knowledge -
Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge -
Chapter 24 Collective Knowledge -
Chapter 25 A Look Back -
Chapter 26 Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality -
Chapter 27 The Core Concepts of Epistemology - Index
Misleading Defeaters
Misleading Defeaters
- Chapter:
- (p.95) Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters
- Source:
- When Is True Belief Knowledge?
- Author(s):
Richard Foley
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
This chapter proposes a game in a similar vein to the Gettier game: when a subject has a true belief but seems not to have knowledge, it looks for some key aspect of the situation about which the subject lacks true beliefs. Defeasibility theorists make a strikingly similar recommendation. When confronted with cases in which a subject intuitively lacks knowledge despite having a justified true belief, they too recommend looking for a truth about the situation that the subject lacks, but because they are committed to the Gettier game, they link the subject's ignorance of this truth with the justification requirement. The chapter examines a story discussed by a leading proponent of the defeasibility theory, Peter Klein, before positing its own solution to the game.
Keywords: defeasibility, defeasibility theory, Peter Klein, misleading defeaters, justifications, ignorance
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- Title Pages
-
Chapter 1 An Observation -
Chapter 2 Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge -
Chapter 3 Knowledge Stories -
Chapter 4 Intuitions about Knowledge -
Chapter 5 Important Truths -
Chapter 6 Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs -
Chapter 7 The Beetle in the Box -
Chapter 8 Knowledge Blocks -
Chapter 9 The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief -
Chapter 10 The Value of True Belief -
Chapter 11 The Value of Knowledge -
Chapter 12 The Lottery and Preface -
Chapter 13 Reverse Lottery Stories -
Chapter 14 Lucky Knowledge -
Chapter 15 Closure and Skepticism -
Chapter 16 Disjunctions -
Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge -
Chapter 18 Instability and Knowledge -
Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters -
Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know -
Chapter 21 Introspective Knowledge -
Chapter 22 Perceptual Knowledge -
Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge -
Chapter 24 Collective Knowledge -
Chapter 25 A Look Back -
Chapter 26 Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality -
Chapter 27 The Core Concepts of Epistemology - Index
