- Title Pages
-
Chapter 1 An Observation -
Chapter 2 Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge -
Chapter 3 Knowledge Stories -
Chapter 4 Intuitions about Knowledge -
Chapter 5 Important Truths -
Chapter 6 Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs -
Chapter 7 The Beetle in the Box -
Chapter 8 Knowledge Blocks -
Chapter 9 The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief -
Chapter 10 The Value of True Belief -
Chapter 11 The Value of Knowledge -
Chapter 12 The Lottery and Preface -
Chapter 13 Reverse Lottery Stories -
Chapter 14 Lucky Knowledge -
Chapter 15 Closure and Skepticism -
Chapter 16 Disjunctions -
Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge -
Chapter 18 Instability and Knowledge -
Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters -
Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know -
Chapter 21 Introspective Knowledge -
Chapter 22 Perceptual Knowledge -
Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge -
Chapter 24 Collective Knowledge -
Chapter 25 A Look Back -
Chapter 26 Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality -
Chapter 27 The Core Concepts of Epistemology - Index
Believing That I Don’t Know
Believing That I Don’t Know
- Chapter:
- (p.99) Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know
- Source:
- When Is True Belief Knowledge?
- Author(s):
Richard Foley
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
This chapter explores cases in which we believe something (P) to be true but readily admit we do not know it. Beliefs outside our areas of expertise are commonly like this. In contrast to the knowledge stories of contemporary epistemology, such cases are autobiographical, fusing the roles of storyteller and subject as one. Even in such a scenario the chapter argues that there is nothing puzzling about such reports, though the chapter also looks into other accounts of knowledge which have a harder time explaining such reports. Reliability and justification theorists may be able to come up with ways of explaining why reports of the form “I believe but don't know P” are common, but the chapter argues that there is no need even to search if knowledge is understood in terms of true belief plus adequate information.
Keywords: beliefs, autobiographical knowledge stories, reliability theorists, justification theorists, true belief, adequate information
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- Title Pages
-
Chapter 1 An Observation -
Chapter 2 Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge -
Chapter 3 Knowledge Stories -
Chapter 4 Intuitions about Knowledge -
Chapter 5 Important Truths -
Chapter 6 Maximally Accurate and Comprehensive Beliefs -
Chapter 7 The Beetle in the Box -
Chapter 8 Knowledge Blocks -
Chapter 9 The Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Justified Belief -
Chapter 10 The Value of True Belief -
Chapter 11 The Value of Knowledge -
Chapter 12 The Lottery and Preface -
Chapter 13 Reverse Lottery Stories -
Chapter 14 Lucky Knowledge -
Chapter 15 Closure and Skepticism -
Chapter 16 Disjunctions -
Chapter 17 Fixedness and Knowledge -
Chapter 18 Instability and Knowledge -
Chapter 19 Misleading Defeaters -
Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know -
Chapter 21 Introspective Knowledge -
Chapter 22 Perceptual Knowledge -
Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge -
Chapter 24 Collective Knowledge -
Chapter 25 A Look Back -
Chapter 26 Epistemology within a General Theory of Rationality -
Chapter 27 The Core Concepts of Epistemology - Index
