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When Is True Belief Knowledge?$
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Richard Foley

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691154725

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.001.0001

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Believing That I Don’t Know

Believing That I Don’t Know

(p.99) Chapter 20 Believing That I Don’t Know
When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Richard Foley

Princeton University Press

This chapter explores cases in which we believe something (P) to be true but readily admit we do not know it. Beliefs outside our areas of expertise are commonly like this. In contrast to the knowledge stories of contemporary epistemology, such cases are autobiographical, fusing the roles of storyteller and subject as one. Even in such a scenario the chapter argues that there is nothing puzzling about such reports, though the chapter also looks into other accounts of knowledge which have a harder time explaining such reports. Reliability and justification theorists may be able to come up with ways of explaining why reports of the form “I believe but don't know P” are common, but the chapter argues that there is no need even to search if knowledge is understood in terms of true belief plus adequate information.

Keywords:   beliefs, autobiographical knowledge stories, reliability theorists, justification theorists, true belief, adequate information

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