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When Is True Belief Knowledge?$
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Richard Foley

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780691154725

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.001.0001

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A Priori Knowledge

A Priori Knowledge

(p.110) Chapter 23 A Priori Knowledge
When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Richard Foley

Princeton University Press

This chapter shows how some kinds of knowledge are not readily understandable in terms of adequate information if for no other reason than they seem not to be linked with specific truths. Knowledge of people, places, and things and knowledge how are examples. A priori knowledge is sometimes thought to be a species of knowledge requiring separate treatment, but unlike knowledge how and knowledge of people, places, and things, when S knows something a priori, there is a readily identifiable truth she believes. The a priori is to be distinguished from the necessary. A proposition's being known a priori does not ensure that it is necessary, nor does a proposition's being necessary ensure that it can be known a priori.

Keywords:   a priori knowledge, contingent truths, necessary truths, associated truths, adequate information

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