Behavioral Democratic Theory Applied
Behavioral Democratic Theory Applied
This chapter assesses the relevance of framing effects for particular normative theories of democracy. It shows how the phenomenon of framing discussed in Chapter 1 ought to affect our thinking about democracy. Drawing on the characterization of the field of democratic theory from Chapter 2, it shows the relevance of framing effects for particular categories of normative theories of democracy. It uses the description of behavioral democratic theory from Chapter 3 to show that emphasizing moral reasons, feasibility constraints, and institutional design leads to important insights about the consequences of framing effects. The chapter's general aims are as follows. First, it shows that minimalist theories of democracy—those that place the fewest demands on the political judgment of citizens—can produce only weak moral reasons for endorsing democracy. Second, in order to be feasible, theories of democracy that incorporate more robust epistemic claims must endorse institutional mechanisms capable of counteracting the pernicious effects of framing.
Keywords: framing effects, normative theories, democracy, democratic theory, emphasizing moral reasons, feasibility constraints, institutional design
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