Political Cognitivism: A Defense
Political Cognitivism: A Defense
This chapter offers a defense of one of the main and most controversial assumptions on which the epistemic case for democracy relies, namely that there exists a procedure-independent standard of correctness in political matters and that this standard can be approximated by human decision making. It calls this assumption “political cognitivism.” This chapter deals with various forms of political cognitivism and the so-called fact/value dichotomy, showing that political cognitivism is a position that can be embraced from a great number of perspectives and is compatible with a number of metaethical views. It also answers the antiauthoritarian objection that assuming a common good or a general interest requires an authoritarian and dangerous notion of truth.
Keywords: political cognitivism, fact, value, metaethical views, authoritarian objection, human decision making
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