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Competition Policy and Price Fixing$
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Louis Kaplow

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780691158624

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691158624.001.0001

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(p.443) 19 Conclusion
Competition Policy and Price Fixing

Louis Kaplow

Princeton University Press

This chapter links three arguments offered in favor of the traditional view to the foregoing analysis. One argument asserts a difficulty in attacking purely interdependent behavior because such would involve commanding firms to behave irrationally. Another objection is that making price elevation by oligopolists illegal is inconsistent with the legality of price elevation by monopolists. Third, it is argued that remedies, particularly injunctive relief, directed at price elevation are problematic because they amount to price regulation. The chapter analyzes each of these arguments in turn and provides counterpoints to these three claims. It also makes further arguments on the direct, economically based approach.

Keywords:   direct approach, price elevation, remedies, prior scholarship, oligopolies, competition policy

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