Deterring Unequally I: A Large-n Analysis
Deterring Unequally I: A Large-n Analysis
This chapter tests the deterrent effect of regional power nuclear postures in a large-n statistical design to systematically analyze whether, on average, some nuclear postures deter conflict better than others. It takes nuclear posture as an independent variable, testing whether these postures have differential effects on states' ability to deter the outbreak of conventional conflict. Compared to when the state did not have nuclear weapons, and compared to other states, this chapter considers what effect we should expect these different postures to have on a state's ability to deter the eruption of conventional conflict (general deterrence) against both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.
Keywords: conflict deterrence, large-n analysis, nuclear postures, conventional conflicts, nuclear opponents, non-nuclear opponents, general deterrent effects
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