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Locke on Personal IdentityConsciousness and Concernment$
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Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780691161006

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.001.0001

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Psychological Connectedness

Psychological Connectedness

Chapter:
(p.88) Chapter Eleven Psychological Connectedness
Source:
Locke on Personal Identity
Author(s):

Galen Strawson

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0011

This chapter examines John Locke's notion of psychological connectedness. It suggests that Locke is interested in the (nontransitive) relation of psychological connectedness, and not interested in the (transitive) relation of memory-link-based psychological continuity that has drawn the attention of many of the “neo-Lockeans.” It also suggests the psychological connectedness that matters to Locke is narrower—more fine-grained—than psychological connectedness as ordinarily understood; and this is not simply because consciousness is not the same as memory. The chapter concludes by considering Locke's theory of personal identity as a theory of moral responsibility—given the assumption that the notion of moral responsibility is a coherent one at all.

Keywords:   memory, John Locke, psychological connectedness, psychological continuity, consciousness, personal identity, moral responsibility

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