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Social Evolution and Inclusive Fitness TheoryAn Introduction$
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James A.R. Marshall

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780691161563

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691161563.001.0001

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Models of Social Behavior

Models of Social Behavior

(p.16) Chapter Two Models of Social Behavior
Social Evolution and Inclusive Fitness Theory

James A.R. Marshall

Princeton University Press

This chapter considers a simple and general model of natural selection: replicator dynamics. Many animal traits and behaviors are social, in that they affect the reproductive success not just of the animal performing the behavior, but also conspecifics. Mathematical theories based on classical natural selection, which acts on direct reproduction by individuals, are able to explain the evolution of traits that are for personal advantage. However, this leaves the problem of providing an evolutionary explanation of traits and social behaviors that appear to be personally costly to the bearer, in reproductive terms, while having effects on conspecifics such as increasing their direct reproduction. This chapter uses the replicator dynamics to illustrate the action of natural selection on social behavior, including nonadditive interactions. It considers the additive and nonadditive donation game, and other social interactions, along with public goods games, threshold public goods games, and interactions in structured populations.

Keywords:   natural selection, replicator dynamics, reproductive success, evolution, social behaviors, nonadditive interactions, additive donation game, nonadditive donation game, public goods games, structured populations

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