Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
More Than You Wanted to KnowThe Failure of Mandated Disclosure$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780691161709

Published to Princeton Scholarship Online: October 2017

DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691161709.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM PRINCETON SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.princeton.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Princeton University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in PRSO for personal use.date: 19 October 2019

The Politics of Disclosure

The Politics of Disclosure

Chapter:
(p.138) Chapter 9 The Politics of Disclosure
Source:
More Than You Wanted to Know
Author(s):

Omri Ben-Shahar

Carl E. Schneider

Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:10.23943/princeton/9780691161709.003.0009

This chapter argues that even if simplification worked better, it would often be defeated by the political dynamics of regulation. First, mandates expand, exacerbating the overload problem. Second, new mandates proliferate, exacerbating the accumulation problem. Mandated disclosure is some sort of a regulatory hydra: cut of one of its heads, and two grow back. The politics of lawmaking helps explain why faites simple fails. The chapter explains why lawmakers routinely impose and extend mandates despite their unreliability. It considers a number of factors that affect the creation and perpetuation of disclosure mandates, including the plausibility of disclosure and the idea—however illusory—that mandated disclosure is all benefit and no cost. It suggests that disclosure is politically attractive in part because lawmakers rarely assess its benefits or burdens.

Keywords:   simplification, regulation, overload problem, accumulation problem, mandated disclosure, politics, lawmaking, lawmakers

Princeton Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.