Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation
Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation
This chapter looks at Wittgenstein's iconoclastic account of the structure of rational evaluation, such that all rational evaluation takes place relative to essentially groundless hinge commitments and hence is inherently local. On the face of it Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation seems to come into conflict with the kind of reasoning at issue in closure-style inferences, in that such inferences seem to license knowledge, perhaps even rationally grounded knowledge, of hinge propositions, in conflict with Wittgenstein's proposal. With this in mind, this chapter examines three ways of spelling out the Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation.
Keywords: rational evaluation, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgensteinian account, Wittgenstein's proposal, hinge commitments
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